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Rules for a New Game: Finding a
Workable Solution for Applying Class
Actions to the Arbitration Process
Dunkelman v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The increased use of arbitration clauses in form contracts has raised concerns
about whether mandatory arbitration will prevent consumers from seeking redress
for relatively small claims via class action litigation. 2 One recent study has shown
that an average person living in Los Angeles agrees to arbitrate a dispute arising
out of approximately one-third of all of his or her purchases.3 With the rising use
of arbitration, it does not make sense to allow companies to preclude consumers
from class action litigation by requiring individual arbitration.
In 2003, the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Baz-
zle, indicated that class-wide arbitration was permissible.4 As a result the number
of cases of class-wide arbitration is likely to increase. 5 Because of the few courts
that have actually employed class-wide arbitration it has not been definitively
settled as to how the hybrid procedure should be conducted. One school of
thought emphasizes the class members' due process rights, while another argues
that maintaining the integrity of the arbitration process should be a priority. This
casenote analyzes the two separate theories and attempts to devise a workable
solution for which class-wide arbitration may proceed. The instant case arises out
of a dispute between the Cincinnati Bengals and a class of season ticket holders
for club level luxury seats, and presents an example of a situation where class-
wide arbitration could be most appropriate.6
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff-appellants Jay Dunkelman, Edward Walton, and Robert and Betty
Brown (fans) held season tickets to the National Football League's Cincinnati
Bengals (Bengals) games, but after several years of poor performance by the Ben-
gals, 7 the disillusioned fans lost interest in the Bengals and stopped buying season
1. 821 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
2. Jack Wilson, "No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses," State-Law Unconscionability, and the
Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23
QUINNIIAc L. REV. 737,740 (2004).
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. Hans Smit, Arbitration & Judicial Decision: Class Actions in Arbitration, 14 AM. REv. INT'L
ARB. 175, 176 (2003).
6. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 198.
7. The Bengals' record from 1998-2003 was 27-69, a winning percentage of only 28%. Cincinnati
Bengals Website, http://www.bengals.com/team/yearlystats.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
1
Norton: Norton: Rules for a New Game
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tickets. 8 The defendant-appellee Bengals refused to allow the fans to end their
season ticket ownership and tried to make them continue to pay for their tickets. 9
The fans then sued the Bengals in an effort to get out of their season ticket con-
tracts.' 0
When the Bengals built the new Paul Brown Stadium in Hamilton County,"
they devised a seat license system to pay the construction costs of the new sta-
dium.12 This new system required fans to first bu z a seat license in order for them
to purchase season tickets to the Bengals games.' The seat license was known as
a Charter Ownership Agreement (COA) and after the fan had purchased a COA
for one hundred and fifty dollars per seat, the fan was then eligible to buy season
tickets.' 4 The COA was mailed in a brochure' 5 to solicit buyers for the seat li-
censes and included a section entitled "Charter Ownership Rules and Regulations"
which set out specific terms explaining the parties' obligations.' 6 Included in the
rules and regulations was an obligation to pay a deposit of twenty-five percent of
the initial annual lease price, which was refundable at the end of the lease term.'
Also, if the fan did not pay for their season ticket during the lease term, the one
hundred and fifty dollar COA fee was lost and the fan forfeited the rights to buy
any future season tickets for those seats.'8 The only consequence stated in the
COA brochure for failing to buy season tickets was to forfeit one's right to their
COA and lose any deposit made.'
9
After the COA had been signed and returned to the Bengals, the fan received
a Club Seats License Agreement (CLSA) which specified the seat location and
lease term. 20 The CLSA also contained some additional "rules and regulations"
which were not mentioned in the original COA.21 These additional provisions
included an arbitration clause, as well as default and acceleration clauses which
stated that the fan would have to pay for all non-purchased season tickets for the
8. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 199.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Paul Brown Stadium was built by Hamilton County, Ohio. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Com-
mission Metrodome: Next Generation of Sports Facilities, available at http://www.msfc.com/nextgen-
football-paulbrown.cfm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). It was funded by both public and private financ-
ing, with most of the funding coming from an increase in sales tax to pay the bonds for the new sta-
dium and about fifty million from the Bengals. Id. The stadium is managed on behalf of Hamilton
County by the Bengals. Id. The Bengals played their inaugural game in the stadium on September 10,
2000. Paul Brown Staduim, available at http://football.ballparks.comNFlJCincinnatiBengals
/newindex.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
12. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 200.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The brochure was jointly created by Tri-State Sports, a company hired to help with season ticket
sales, and Hamilton County. Id. The brochure contained a color-coded diagram of Paul Brown Sta-
dium for the fans to decide where they wanted to purchase their seats. Id. The brochure also contained
a payment schedule for the upcoming seasons. Id. The payment schedule also explained the terms of
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duration of the lease if the fan defaulted on the season ticket contract.22 Unlike
the COA, which required a signature and was to be returned, the CLSA did not
require the fan to sign and return the document.
23
The primary issue for determination is whether the COA or CLSA terms con-
trol the relationship between the parties. The Bengals contend that the CLSA
terms which include the arbitration provision and the default and acceleration
clause are the controlling rules and the COA brochure was just that, merely a bro-
chure.24 The Bengals further argue that the fans are bound to arbitration as a re-
sult of a settlement agreement 25 reached between general admission season ticket
holders and the Bengals.26 In response, the fans argue the COA rules control the
relationship because they signed the COA agreeing to the rules and regulations
contained in the brochure.27 The fans also assert that the settlement reached be-
tween general admission season ticket holders and the Bengals does not apply to
their status as club level season ticket holders.
28
At the Court of Common Pleas in Hamilton County, the fans alleged negli-
gent misrepresentation and fraud, 29 and violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act, 30 seeking to enjoin the Bengals from collecting money and harass-
ing them about payments.31 The trial court did not rule on the merits or the pre-
liminary injunction, instead granting a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbi-
tration between the parties. 32 The trial court found the arbitration clause between
the parties enforceable.
33
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, reversed the decision of the trial
court and remanded the case, giving instructions to the trial court to lift the stay
pending arbitration and to rule on the preliminary injunction motion.34 The court
of appeals held that the distinction between club level season ticket holders and
general admission season ticket holders was sufficient to separate the groups for
the purposes of a class action as the two groups had signed "entirely different"
agreements with the Bengals.35 The court also held the arbitration clause was
invalid where an agreement had already been reached between the contracting
parties in the COA; finding the fans did not assert and had no expectation of addi-
tional terms being included in the CLSA.
36
22. Id.
23. Id. at 200-01.
24. Id.
25. This settlement arose out of a similar case, Reedy v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., in which general
admissions season ticket holders argued that they were not bound by a similar arbitration agreement.
758 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
26. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 202.
27. Id. at 200.
28. Id. at 202.
29. Id. at 199.
30. OHI-o REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.02 (2005).
31. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 201.
32. Id. at 202.
33. Id. at 199.
34. Id. at 205.
35. Id. at 202.
36. Id. at 204.
20051
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1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Class Arbitration: How Much Involvement Should the Courts Have in
the Arbitration Process?
The rationale behind class actions is to improve the efficiency of the judicial
system by creating means to consolidate claims arising out of a common nucleus
of facts into one action. 37 Class actions provide an opportunity for parties to liti-
gate relatively small claims, allocate judicial resources efficiently, and prevent
inconsistent results arising out of the same set of facts.38 Arbitration has also been
used as a means of increasing the efficiency of the judicial system where parties
have agreed to resolve their disputes before a private arbitrator. 39 The benefits of
arbitration are speedy resolution, low cost, and the preservation of goodwill be-
tween the disputants. n° The advantages of combining the class action mechanism
of procedure with the arbitration process are the same as those which make class
actions advantageous to individual litigation: "to promote efficiency and consis-
tency while providing an expeditious and less costly mechanism for resolving
disputes., 41 The primary concern with class-wide arbitration is the difficulty of
incorporating all the procedural requirements of Rule 2342 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure into arbitration without too much judicial involvement.4 3
Rule 23 concerning class actions sets out several procedural rules with which
courts must adhere in order to litigate a class action.44 Rule 23(a) has four prereq-
uisites which must be met before a class action can be sustained: 1) the class must
be large enough that joinder of all members is impracticable, 2) the questions of
law or fact are common to the entire class, 3) the claims or defenses of the parties
are typical to the claims or defenses of the entire class, and 4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.45 If these pre-
requisites are met the court then decides whether to certify a class action 4 6 Once
a class has been certified, the court must make sure that all members of the class
are notified of the nature of the class action, the definition of the class, the claims
or defenses, give them the choice to exclude themselves from the class, and ex-
plain the binding effect of a class judgment.47 The court also has the responsibil-
ity to approve any settlement or voluntary dismissal in order to protect any absent
class members.48 It is uncertain to what extent these rules, which must be fol-
37. Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV.
787, 787 (1981).
38. Id. at 788.
39. Id. at 792-93.
40. Id. at 793-94.
41. Id. at 798.
42. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
43. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 53 (2000).
44. See id.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).
[Vol. 2
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lowed by the court in formal litigation of class actions, should be handled by a
court in a class-wide arbitration setting.49
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not address the issue of class-wide
arbitration. ° In the absence of an explicit rule in the FAA, the Supreme Court has
not yet ruled affirmatively as to whether class-wide arbitration is permissible un-
der the FAA.5' The Supreme Court did address class-wide arbitration in Green-
tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, but only reached the issue of whether it was the
decision of the court or the arbitrator to determine whether the agreement between
52the parties allowed class-wide arbitration. The plurality treated the issue as one
of contract interpretation and avoided answering whether class-wide arbitration is
permissible when an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue.53 The federal
courts have routinely held that when arbitration agreements are silent on the issue
of class-wide arbitration, it is not allowed. 54 However, the FAA's non-treatment
of class-wide arbitration has provided an invitation for state courts to create their
own policies regarding class arbitration.
55
B. State Court Treatment of Class-Arbitration: Judicial Involvement to
Preserve the Integrity of the Class Action
The first court to order class-wide arbitration was a California Court of Ap-
peals in Keating v. Superior Court.56 The court in Keating determined, after
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of class arbitration, that "there is no
insurmountable obstacle to conducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis., 57
Another case allowing class-wide arbitration to proceed is Dickler v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc.,58 a Pennsylvania state court case. The Dickler court also
found strong policy arguments in favor of allowing class-wide arbitration to pro-
ceed. 59 In a case such as Dickler, where each class member can only seek a rela-
tively small amount of relief, the costs for each individual claimant to individually
arbitrate their claims would far outweigh the advantages to arbitrating the dis-
49. See Stemlight, supra note 43, at 43-44.
50. Jonathan R. Bunch, Note, To Be Announced: Silence from the United States Supreme Court and
Disagreement Among Lower Courts Suggest an Uncertain Future for Class-Wide Arbitration, 2004 J.
Disp. RESOL. 259, 264.
51. Id.
52. 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
53. Bunch, supra note 50, at 266.
54. See id. at 264. The Seventh Circuit agreed with several other courts addressing similar questions
by holding that the FAA does not authorize courts to order class-wide arbitration when an arbitration
contract does not specifically address the issue. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir.
1995).
55. The most notable state decisions on class-wide arbitration have come from California in a line of
cases recognizing the legality of class-wide arbitration. See Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
rev'd on other grounds.
56. Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
57. Id.
58. 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 1991).
59. See id. at 864. See also Leason v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., No. 6914, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 587
(Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 1984) (demonstrating the difficulty that arises when an individual does not have a
claim large enough to make it economically feasible to bring an individual lawsuit, but is bound to
arbitration and thus cannot bring a class action lawsuit).
2005]
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pute.60 The economic disincentive to individually arbitrate each claim would
effectively allow the offending party to continue their harmful and improper prac-
tices.6' The Keating and Dickler courts have provided a few guidelines for other
courts to follow when allocating the responsibility of the courts in a class-wide
arbitration proceeding.
The Keating court determined that anytime class-wide arbitration was ordered
by the court "a greater degree of judicial involvement than is normally associated
with arbitration" would be necessary. 62 The court carefully considered the diffi-
culties that combining a class action lawsuit with an arbitration proceeding would
63bring. Among the concerns they considered was the "unnecessary interference
by the courts in and undue delay of the arbitration process. 64 In addition, the
courts would have to oversee the named plaintiffs to ensure that they were provid-
ing adequate representation for absent class members. 65 As the Supreme Court of
California stated in an appeal of Keating v. Superior Court,
The court would have to make initial determinations regarding certifica-
tion and notice to the class, and if classwide arbitration proceeds it may
be called upon to exercise a measure of external supervision in order to
safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate representation
and in the event of dismissal or settlement.
66
In Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., another California case, the court fol-
lowed the Keating decision, ordering the lower court to certify the plaintiff's class
67and provide proper notice when ordering arbitration to proceed.
The court in Dickler likewise determined that in order to apply class-wide ar-
bitration, the trial court will have to be involved in some procedural issues such as
class certification. 68 The Dickler court noted that in order to proceed with class-
wide arbitration it would be necessary for the court to certify the class, ensure that
notice to class members is properly given, and review any proposed settlement to
make sure absent class members have been adequately represented. 69 The court
also discussed the additional complexities that would accompany certifying class
arbitrations.70 Because of the uniqueness of the arbitration process, the courts
60. Dickler, 596 A.2d at 864.
61. Id.
62. Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 490. Interference by the courts could be caused by the court attempting to oversee the
procedural processes mandated by FRCP 23 such as certification, notice of class members, approval of
settlement or dismissal of a class action, and appointing class counsel. Id. This type of court supervi-
sion of the arbitration process could also result in delays which would undermine the speedy and
efficient nature of arbitration. Id.
65. Id.
66. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209.
67. 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
68. Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
69. Id.
70. Id. These additional complexities include whether the particular forum is appropriate for the
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may have to use a stricter standard for class certification. 71 The rigid schedule for
judicial supervision set forth by these courts is not the only way to approach class-
wide arbitration. Some commentators argue that too much judicial interference
would reduce the effectiveness of the arbitration process.
72
C. Preserving the Nature of Arbitration: Less Judicial Involvement in
Class-Arbitration
The decisions of the few courts who have allowed class-wide arbitration to
proceed have been careful to point out what roles the courts will have to play in
the class arbitration process. However, some commentators have suggested
ways for class-wide arbitration to proceed with as little judicial interference as
possible. One suggestion is that arbitrators, and not the courts, should make the
initial decision of class certification.74 Advantages of the arbitrator making the
class certification decision would be to avoid court delays and allow for greater
procedural flexibility.75 Critics of this view argue that arbitrators do not have the
necessary expertise or experience to make the class certification decision. 76 In
contrast, it is quite possible that the arbitrator's expertise in manageability in the
arbitral setting could make him more competent to deal with class certification.77
This method would mean that after the case goes to the arbitrator the courts
would not become involved again until after the arbitration award has been is-
sued.78 After the award has been rendered by the arbitrator it would be subject to
postarbitration judicial review. 79 Just like ordinary arbitration proceedings, the
standard of review would make it very difficult to overturn an arbitrator's decision
on the merits. 80 Even if the class certification granted by the arbitrator were found
to be erroneous, the merits of the decision would not have to be overturned and
the decision would still stand for the named class members.
8
'
The requirement in Rule 23(c) that courts provide appropriate notice would
not be extremely difficult to overcome. 82 Notice, which is normally overseen by a
judge in normal class action litigation, could just as easily be directed by an arbi-
trator.8 3 All that is necessary of the arbitrator is to determine the best form of
notice which would inform class members of the impending action.84 The notice
should include information about the controversy as well as tell class members
71. Id.
72. See Daniel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration and JOB-5 Claims in the Wake of Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 380,400-01 (1989).
73. Keating and Dickler both mention how the court will have to be involved in such areas such as
class certification, notice, and review of any settlement. See Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr.
481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Dickler, 596 A.2d 860.
74. Note, supra note 37, at 806.
75. Id.
76. Stemlight, supra note 43, at 51.
77. Note, supra note 37, at 806.
78. Id. at 806-07.
79. Id. at 807-08.
80. Id. at 808.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 799.
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that they can opt out of the arbitration, challenge the arbitrator's decision, chal-
lenge the adequacy of representation, or even intervene if the representation is
held to be inadequate. 5
The possibility of intervention could create disagreements between multiple
representatives; however, this does not present a reason not to proceed with class-
86
wide arbitration. In the case where a class member is not happy with the initial
representative, she may want to become a representative. 87 Too many representa-
tives could complicate the arbitration proceedings, and the court would be justi-
fied to not certify the class and let each member arbitrate individually.8 8 The same
type of result could just as easily be a problem in normal class-action litigation.
One proposed framework for class-wide arbitration would have the entire ar-
bitration process free of court interference after the court made the initial decision
on whether the arbitration clause should be enforced. 89 Then the courts could
review the arbitrator's rulings on issues such as class certification, notice, and a
review of the award.90 Another proposal suggests that the court certify the class,
and then the courts would not interfere until after the arbitration award has been
issued. 9'
Following the Supreme Court decision in Bazzle, the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) developed a set of rules and procedures for class-wide arbitra-
tion.92 The supplementary rules drafted by the AAA are very similar to the class
action rules in FRCP Rule 23.9 Rule Two of the Supplementary Rules states that
the arbitrator shall determine if the parties' contracts allow for class arbitration,
after the arbitrator's decision a 30 day stay of proceedings is granted to allow any
parties to challenge the arbitrator's decision in court.94 Next, the arbitrator is to
make a class certification determination using factors reflecting FRCP Rule 23(a),
except that each class member must have entered an arbitration clause similar to
"that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other class members."
95
Following the class certification by the arbitrator, proceedings will again be stayed
pending judicial review of the decision if any parties wish to challenge. 96 Once
the class arbitration is set to proceed the arbitrator should direct the "best notice
practicable in the circumstances . to all class members who can be identified
through the reasonable efforts. 97 The rest of the arbitration process is to proceed
without interference from the courts.98 Any settlement or voluntary dismissal
85. Id.
86. Waltcher, supra note 72, at 404.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Note, supra note 37, at 812.
90. Id. at 812-13.
91. Waltcher, supra note 72, at 404.
92. American Arbitration Association, Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 2005), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967 [hereinafter AAA Policy].
93. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter AAA Rules].
94. Id. at Rule 2.
95. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); AAA Rules, supra note 93, at Rule 4.
96. AAA Rules, supra note 93, at Rule 5(d).
97. Id. at Rule 6(a).
98. See AAA Rules, supra note 93.
[Vol. 2
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must be determined to be fair by the arbitrator, 99 and the final award must be in a
writing signed by the arbitrator(s). 1°° This written award must state the reason for
the award on the merits and define the members of the class who are bound by the
award with specificity.10' Regardless of how the courts approach the procedural
issues of class arbitration, the position taken by the Keating court in California
that there is no "insurmountable obstacle" to conducting class-wide arbitration
reflects the idea that the benefits of class-wide arbitration outweigh any prob-
lems.1 o2
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals of the First District of Ohio was
faced with the decision of whether arbitration could be imposed on a class of foot-
ball fans who had purchased club level season tickets. ° 3 The court used a de
novo standard of review because the main issue of the case involved questions of
law.' 0 4 The court made decisions on three issues: 1) whether the fans were part of
a class previously bound by arbitration, 2) whether the arbitration clause included
in the CLSA was valid, and 3) whether the trial court should have ruled on the
preliminary injunction before issuing a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbi-
tration.'
0 5
The court first addressed the Bengals' argument that the fans were bound by
an arbitration clause in a settlement agreement' ° 6 arising out of the 2000 case
Reedy v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.'0 7 The instant court agreed with the fans argu-
ment that the COA signed by the fans in this case was "entirely different" from
the general admission COA in Reedy.108 The court distinguished between the club
level season ticket holders and the general admission season ticket holders primar-
ily on the basis that the adhesion contractsl °9 included in the COA's were entirely
different." 0 Therefore, the fans in the instant case could not be included in the
class settlement negotiated by the class bound by the Reedy settlement."' After
determining the instant class did not share a sufficient "common nucleus" with the
99. Id. at Rule 8(a).
100. Id. at Rule 10.
101. Id. at Rule 7.
102. See Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), vacated, 645 P.2d
1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd inpart sub noma. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
103. Dunkelman v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 198, 199-200 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
104. Id. at 201-02.
105. Id. at 202, 204.
106. Id. at 202.
107. Reedy v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). Reedy, which is very
similar to the instant case on its facts, was decided four years ago and ruled that the class of general
admission ticket holders was bound by arbitration. Id. at 686.
108. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 202.
109. An adhesion contract is a standard form contract that is prepared by a party in a position of
power to be signed by a weaker party with less bargaining power, usually a consumer. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 318-19 (7th ed. 1999).
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class in Reedy to be bound to arbitration, the court then determined whether the
fans had agreed to submit to arbitration under the CLSA." 2
The court found that the trial court erred in staying judicial proceedings pend-
ing arbitration." 3 The court acknowledged the public policy in Ohio was in favor
of resolving disputes through arbitration. 14 However, the court also noted that
arbitration is a matter of contract." 5 When it is clear that the parties have not
agreed to arbitrate their dispute, then arbitration is not proper and the court is jus-
tified to order judicial proceedings." 6 In this case, the court found that the facts in
the instant case were nearly identical to that of the Reedy case decided four years
prior. 117 The Bengals further argued that the fans' payment made after they re-
ceived the CLSA signified their assent to the terms of the CLSA. 18 However, the
court followed the decision in Reedy which held that the initial rules and regula-
tions, which came with the COA, formed the complete contract.1 9 Therefore, the
CLSA sent out by the Bengals was not binding on the fans.' 20 Like the Reedy
court, the Dunkelman court held that as a matter of contract law the Bengals had
not offered any consideration to impose new terms on the fans.'
21
The final issue is whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the fans' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction prior to ordering the parties to arbitrate their dis-
pute.' 22 The court determined that "[wihen a trial court is faced with a motion to
stay pending arbitration and a motion for a preliminary injunction, the motion for
a preliminary injunction should be heard first."' 123 Because the court had already
decided there was no valid arbitration agreement, the court did not rule on the
preliminary injunction issue, only noting what their decision would have been if it
had been necessary. 24
On the first issue, whether the fans were part of a class previously bound by
arbitration, the court ruled against the Bengals in their argument that the fans
should be bound to arbitration by the Reedy settlement because the adhesion con-
tracts on the COAs signed by the two groups of fans were "entirely different"
agreements.125 On the second question of whether the arbitration clause included
in the CLSA was valid, the court found that the entire contract between the Ben-
gals and the fans was contained in the COA, and the additional terms in the CLSA
were not binding because they were not accompanied byconsideration. 126 On the
third question of whether a trial court should have ruled on the preliminary injunc-
tion before issuing a stay of judicial proceedings, the court acknowledged that the
motion for a preliminary injunction should have been heard by the court before
112. Id.
113. Id. at 204.
114. Id. at 203.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 202.
117. Id. at 202-03.
118. Id. at 203-04.




123. Id. (citing Yudin v. Knight Indus. Corp., 672 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1996)).
124. Id. at 204-05.
125. Id. at 202.
126. Id. at 203-04.
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issuing a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration.1 27 Even though the
court found the fans were not bound to arbitration, the superior bargaining power
of the Bengals forcing an adhesion contract on the fans demonstrates why a pro-
cedure for class-wide arbitration should be constructed to be implemented in
situations such as this.
V. COMMENT
A. Why a Class-Wide Arbitration Procedure is Necessary
The instant case, like both Dickler and Keating, arose out of a dispute over
form contracts. Form contracts often provide a way for a party in a stronger bar-
gaining position to force unfavorable terms on the weaker party. In Dunkelman,
the plaintiffs found themselves in a situation where the most efficient and favor-
able method of seeking redress would be in a class action proceeding.'28 How-
ever, if the parties were held to an arbitration clause in a form contract, they
would be unable to proceed as a class, enjoying the efficiency and cost benefits of
a class action; instead, they would have to proceed individually. This unfortunate
result in jurisdictions which have not yet allowed class arbitration to proceed,
denies the opportunity for many innocent consumers to seek redress where they
have suffered minimal damages.'
29
The Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, has made
it clear that class actions may be entertained in arbitration. 30 This is a big step
towards fairly resolving consumer disputes with large companies arising out of
form contracts. Class-wide arbitration is a legal mechanism which can prove most
effective, particularly when one considers the lack of alternatives which exist to
consumers who are trapped into individual arbitration clauses found in adhesion
contracts.13' One major question remains to be resolved before class-wide arbitra-
tion is to be integrated into state and federal courts. 132 This unresolved issue is
whether class-wide arbitration should proceed under a rigid schedule of judicial
supervision or if arbitrators should be given a certain degree of independence to
oversee the proceedings similar to a normal arbitration. The adoption of a proce-
dural framework which retains the characteristics of arbitration while recognizing
due process concerns inherent in class actions would make it more likely that
courts would approve use of class-wide arbitration.
127. Id. at 204-05.
128. Dunkelman, 821 N.E.2d at 199.
129. The California case of Szetela v. Discover Bank provides another example of a case where not
allowing class arbitration resulted in a manifest injustice. 118 Cal. Rptr.2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
In that case, a no class action arbitration clause forced the parties to individually arbitrate each of their
claims. Id. at 865. Because each claim was only worth about twenty-nine dollars, this effectively
prevented most parties from seeking redress from Discover. Id. at 865. As a result, the court found the
clause unconscionable. Id. at 864.
130. Smit, supra note 5, at 176; 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
131. The court in Keating v. Superior Court offers a quote reflecting this idea: "Classwide arbitration,
as Sir Winston Churchill said of democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but to its
alternatives." 645 P.2d 192, 1209 (Cal. 1982).
132. Before Bazzle, only Pennsylvania and California state courts allowed for class arbitration and no
federal courts had allowed it. Wilson, supra note 2, at 775.
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B. Due Process Concerns
The courts and commentators who prefer strict judicial supervision cite their
concern for the due process of absent class members.' 33 The due process rights of
absent class members are certainly an important consideration that must be taken
into account when devising a method to apply class-wide arbitration. The first
question to ask in ensuring compliance with the due process rights of absent class
members is: "What level of due process is required in class-wide arbitration?"
Once the level of due process is established, the second question becomes: "What
procedures are required in class-wide arbitration to meet this level of due proc-
ess?"
In answer to the first question, some believe that by agreeing to have a dis-
pute settled by arbitration, parties have agreed to waive their rights to due process
of law. 134 Arbitration should not be considered to be a waiver of due process.
Although arbitration, by its nature, fails to provide a guarantee of the same rights
found in the court system, that does not mean one waives all rights to due process
by agreeing to arbitration. Constitutional rights of citizens must be taken very
seriously and cannot be waived by virtue of a citizen signing an adhesion contract
which happens to contain an arbitration clause.' 35 Even where due process was
not found to be applicable in a class-wide arbitration setting, a standard of fairness
has been applied to arbitration proceedings by the courts. 36 This means that at a
minimum, the arbitrator is required to at least adhere to a fairness standard, which
presumably would comport with the due process rights found in the Constitu-
tion. 37
Because it has been established that the due process rights of absent class
members must be respected, the second question is how to conduct class-wide
arbitration without violating those rights. At one end of the spectrum are the
courts which have already applied class-wide arbitration.' 38 They would have the
court supervise the entire class arbitration process including, determination of
whether arbitration is appropriate, selection of an arbitrator, class certification,
notice, discovery, settlement/dismissal, award, and adequacy of representation. 39
While this would certainly guarantee the due process rights of absent class mem-
bers, it is an impracticable method. Although the California and Pennsylvania
courts which have applied class-wide arbitration have involved the courts exten-
sively, there is a better way that would satisfy both the due process concerns of
absent class members while still preserving the independent nature of arbitration.
133. Stemlight, supra note 43, at 52.
134. Id. at 116.
135. See id. at 116-17.
136. Note, supra note 37, at 800-03 (citing Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing,
Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979); Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923
(2d Cir. 1974)).
137. Id.
138. California and Pennsylvania are the only states whose courts have ordered class-wide arbitration.
Wilson, supra note 2, at 775.
139. C. Evan Stewart, Are Class Actions Appropriate in Arbitrations?, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1991 at 6.
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C. Proposed Framework of Conducting Class-Wide Arbitration
The best way to conduct class-wide arbitration is to allow for an appeal of the
arbitrator's class certification prior to arbitration, let the arbitration proceed unin-
terrupted, and then allow class members to challenge for inadequate representa-
tion after the arbitrator's final award. This would provide for protection of the
due process rights of absent class members while still promoting a speedy, effi-
cient and independent arbitration. This process would include some features to
protect the due process of class members and also some which would allow arbi-
tration to take place independent of excessive court interference. This model
closely follows the approach suggested by the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), and advocates an alternative process to that followed by the Pennsylvania
and California courts which have previously implemented class-wide arbitration.
To ensure due process to absent class members at the class certification stage,
an opportunity must be made for class members who do not agree with the class
determination to appeal the arbitrator's decision. The Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitrations drafted by the AAA provide for a 30-day period during which
class members can challenge the arbitrator's interpretation of the arbitration clause
or class determination." 4° Once the class has been certified and judicial proceed-
ings are complete, the arbitration would begin unimpeded by judicial interference
until after a final decision has been rendered.
During this stage of the arbitration process interlocutory appeals would not be
allowed. This would streamline the process and prevent the kind of drawn out and
complicated litigation that arbitration seeks to avoid. This approach would be
preferable to that taken by the courts in California for two reasons. First, it pre-
serves the advantages of the arbitration process such as speed, efficiency, cost,
and finality. Second, it prevents class-wide arbitration from becoming overly
burdened by judicial interference.
However, some additional procedures during the arbitration would be neces-
sary to ensure the protection of absent class members. First, the arbitrator should
be required to provide a written award.' 4' A written award would not only help a
court to review the award given by the arbitrator, it would allow the parties to
understand the grounds of the arbitrator's decision. Second, a written record of
the arbitration hearings should be kept for a court to review if an absent class
member argues inadequate representation. 142 This would maintain the speedy and
efficient characteristics of the arbitration process without compromising the rights
of class members.
At the end of the arbitration, if an absent class member believed they were in-
adequately represented, they could challenge the arbitrator's judgment against
them to a court. In most circumstances, the arbitrator would be equally qualified
to determine adequacy of counsel as a judge,143 but providing for an appeal would
guarantee that no class member would be treated unfairly. Similarly, the court
140. AAA Rules, supra note 93, at Rules 3, 5.
141. A written decision, although not normally required in the arbitration setting, would state the
reasons for the arbitrator's decision. The AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration includes
this as a requirement. AAA Rules, supra note 93, at Rule 10.
142. Note, supra note 37, at 813.
143. See Waltcher, supra note 72, at 403-05.
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would also be able to review any settlements or voluntary dismissals made by the
parties in the course of arbitration. This would comply with FRCP 23(e) without
interfering with the arbitration process because a settlement or dismissal would
indicate the end of the arbitration anyway. Although arbitrators are likely to be
just as competent as judges, the fact that they are not bound by Article III of the
Constitution implies that they should not be expected to uphold the rights and
guarantees of the Constitution.14
Under this method the arbitrator would keep a record of the proceedings and
provide a written award so the courts would not have to observe the entire arbitra-
tion to determine adequacy of counsel. It would be unnecessary for the court to
oversee the entire arbitration process to ensure adequate representation when they
could hear the evidence and make a decision based on the testimony of partici-
pants, facts in the record, and other evidence used to decide this kind of matter.
This method is better than those previously used by courts in California and Penn-
sylvania because it provides a mechanism to protect absent class members from
inadequate representation without burdening the court and compromising the na-
ture of arbitration.
The final award given by the arbitrator should have the same effect as in a
normal arbitration. Because all the parties in a class-wide arbitration received
notice of the proceeding and had an opportunity to opt out of the class, they are
aware of the binding nature of an arbitration award. Therefore it is unnecessary to
provide them with a lower standard of review than is ordinarily applied to over-
turning an arbitrator's award. One commentator, however, suggests a framework
that would allow parties to seek court review of the arbitrator's decision on the
merits.145 This procedure would not promote the advantages of class-wide arbitra-
tion. The result would be to undermine the arbitration process and effectively
result in the court deciding the actual dispute.
Establishing a procedure for class-wide arbitration which involves extensive
interference by the judiciary would defeat all of the benefits of arbitration. How-
ever, the due process issues raised in the class action context requires more than
the ordinary degree of protection found in arbitrations. Class-wide arbitration can
be advantageous to both parties if a few compromises are made to allow the proc-
ess to flow smoothly. Consumers bound by arbitration can still bring class ac-
tions, eliminating the ability of a stronger party to take away their right to seek
redress for small claims by forcing individual arbitration. 146 The benefits to the
stronger party enforcing the arbitration clause are still the efficiency, speed, and
low cost of arbitrations relative to judicial litigation.
Applying a framework like the one suggested here would retain the integrity
of both arbitration and class actions. Allowing the actual arbitration proceeding to
continue uninterrupted would promote the advantages that accompany arbitration.
144. See Sternlight, supra note 43, at 53.
145. Note, supra note 37, at 813.
146. In the wake of Bazzle many commentators are exploring the consequences of "No-Class-Action
Arbitration Clauses" (NCAACs) and whether they are enforceable. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 741
(finding a split in state court decisions as to whether NCAACs are unconscionable and unenforceable).
Commentators have also studied whether arbitration agreements that are silent on the issue of class
arbitration should bar class arbitration. See Stemlight, supra note 43, at 83-90 (arguing that courts
should not interpret silent agreements as barring class arbitration.)
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At the same time, opportunities to appeal at the beginning and end of the proceed-
ings provide absent class members to appeal a denial of their rights to the court.
Although some of the advantages to arbitration must be compromised in order to
find a workable solution, the end result can be summarized by Judge Feinberg in
Keating, "[w]e have concluded that there is no insurmountable obstacle to con-
ducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis."'
147
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the difficulties involved with finding a way to balance the due proc-
ess interests of class members and the independent nature of arbitration, there is
no reason why a compromise cannot be reached that would satisfy the primary
concerns of both sides to the issue. Class-wide arbitration is an idea whose time
has come. Although what procedures should be applied to resolve disputes may
be a little unclear at the moment, if courts will adopt a method that recognizes the
importance of due process concerns while minimizing departure from a traditional
arbitration setting, this is an issue that can be overcome. Due to the need for a
way to apply the class action device to situations where consumers are bound by
arbitration, this question should be addressed by all courts so that class-wide arbi-
tration can be applied fairly and uniformly.
ANDREW REMY NORTON
147. Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481,492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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